Serving in uniform during Spring: a case study of the role of the Egyptian military in the transition by Voogd-el Mhamdi, L. de
1Serving in uniform during the Spring
A case study of the role of the Egyptian military in the transition
By 
Lebna de Voogd-el Mhamdi 
Supervisor: dr. Daniela Stockmann
Bachelorproject: Vergelijkende politiek
Deelproject: Arab Spring
©UPI
2Table of Contents
Chapter I Introduction.....................................................................................................3
Chapter II Theoretical part ...............................................................................................7
Part I Developmental theory of Democracy ..................................................................7
Part II Role of the military in transitions ........................................................................9
Chapter III Research Design............................................................................................11
Chapter IV The case study of the Egyptian army .............................................................16
Part I The role of the military in the revolution-period ................................................16
Military-civilian relations since the revolution of 1952 .................................................18
No presidential control over the military .......................................................................21
Part II The role of the military in the post-revolutionary period....................................23
Downfall of the regime .................................................................................................24
Suspending Emergency Law.........................................................................................25
Freedom .......................................................................................................................25
Justice...........................................................................................................................27
Transfer of power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to a civilian-
government...................................................................................................................28
Constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources.................................................28
Part III The role of the military and democratization .....................................................28
Chapter V Conclusion ....................................................................................................33
References............................................................................................................................37
3Chapter I Introduction
The Egyptian revolution has celebrated her first anniversary in 2012. Is there a cause for 
celebration? The New York Times reported this April that the Egyptian Army is not only 
closing down civil society organizations but also successfully manipulating the drafting 
process of the new constitution (Dunne & Nawaz 2012). The committee that was working on 
a new constitution has been suspended by an Egyptian administrative court (Kirkpatrick 
2012). The suspension has serious consequences because the Egyptian people will elect a 
president before the ratification of a new constitution. The new president will have the same 
powers that the former President Hosni Mubarak had during his dictatorship. The formation 
of a democratic government and the development of democracy will therefore face major 
challenges. This paper will focus on the challenges related to the role of the army in 
promoting or obstructing the democratization. 
Diamond (2011:299) was like many scholars surprised by the development of a possible 
fourth wave represented by the 2011 Arab Spring. Unlike Diamond who speaks of the 
possibility of a fourth wave Plattner presents the Arab Spring Uprisings of 2011 as a set of 
revolts that provoked a fourth wave of democratization after nearly a decade of decline in 
democracy worldwide (2011:5). According to Plattner the revolts have contradicted the idea 
of Arab countries being resistant to development of democracy.
The military helped to bring down the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian army 
sided with the protesters. At the beginning of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ the military 
presented itself as keeper of the revolution and promoter of the transition from authoritarian 
4regime to democracy. The Spring started in Tunisia and its wind blew over several Arab 
countries. The Arab Spring surprised many scholars. Gause III has explored the reasons why 
middle east experts failed to predict the Arab Spring (2011: 81). He elaborates on the 
assumption of the unbreakable and close relationship between the dictators and their armies. 
This assumption was made by most of the scholars. Egypt and Tunisia proved this assumption 
to be incorrect. He finds the explanation for this incorrectness in the fact that scholars in the 
field of Middle Eastern studies lost academic interest in studying the role of the military in 
Arab politics. The stability of the Arab regimes since the 1950s and 1960s led him and other 
scholars to assume that the subject had no relevance. 
Unlike the role of the Arab military in transition to democracy the role of the military in the 
South European and Southern American democratic transitions has been subject of serious 
academic study. In this paper I would like to make a contribution in reducing the “gap” in the 
study of the role of Arab militaries in democratic transitions through a case study of the role 
of the Egyptian military in the transition from authoritarianism. 
The Egyptian army has two significant choices to make. It will have to choose between 
peaceful transition to democracy or repressive transition to military rule. Analysing the choice 
the army has made in the transition by examining whether the military has changed its 
professional and corporate identity will help make a prediction on accepting civilian control 
over the military power. It will predict the readiness of the Egyptian army to change and 
readjust in a manner that can advance democracy.
Diamond argues that the near and far future will be marked by cycles and by ups and downs 
in a lengthily struggle to define the future political shape of the Arab world (2011:305). 
Exploring the military’s capacity in facing the ups and downs is important to understand the
role of the military in the shaping of political landscape in the future.
5This paper is an “instrumental case study”. The case study of the role of the military in Arab 
democratic transitions will be dominated by the focus on answering the following research 
question: “which role did the Egyptian military, play in promoting or hindering 
democratization in Egypt?” Analyzing the political actions the militaries took during the
uprisings and the downfall of Mubarak will allow answering the question whether the military 
has promoted or obstructed the democratization process after the uprisings. 
The theoretical framework provided by Larry Diamond and Felipe Agüero will help in 
interpreting the answer to the research question. The theory of developmental democracy will 
be used to classify the regimes in the case study and the results of the study of Felipe Agüero 
on military-civilian relations will give insight in how other authoritarian regimes in Latin-
America and South Europe were able to reshape the military-civilian relations to facilitate 
democratization. Agüero has researched the conditions under what civilian rule in a post 
authoritarian context can establish democracy in the face of military resistance. In his study 
he compares the Spanish case with cases in Southern Europe and South America. 
Although conclusions from a single case are insufficient to confirm or contradict general 
theories. This paper aims to contribute to the debate about the effect of militaries in new to be 
established Arab democracies. The current Egyptian regime held competitive parliamentary 
elections, while power remains mainly in the hands of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces. 
It thus falls in the category of hybrid regimes (Diamond:2002). The Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces is not elected. Parties are under conditions allowed to compete. Nevertheless 
the core political power is out of their reach. Systems as the Egyptian system that combine 
authoritarian and democratic elements make it difficult to determine the dynamics of the 
6regime. Discovering the role the military hold in the dynamic may help obtain insight into the 
assistance the military should provide for the democratization process. 
Chapter II includes the literature review that will assist in exploring the research topic in 
chapter IV. The research design will be set out in chapter III. Chapter V contains the 
conclusion and the summary of the answers on the research questions. 
7Chapter II Theoretical part
During the Egyptian revolts of 2011 the Egyptian army supported the protesters and did not 
side with president Hosni Mubarak. His presidency came to an end and offered an opening for 
a transition from the authoritarian rule to possibly a democratic rule. The aftermath of the 
downfall of this dictatorship raise important questions regarding the role of the Egyptian army 
in democratic changes. This questions will be answered in chapter IV. Why did the Egyptian 
army not side and defend the president? How did the military after the collapse of Mubarak 
use the opportunity to help build a democracy? Did the military actively intervene in the 
political process by creating conditions that help promote or sabotage a peaceful transition to 
democracy? These questions can not be answered properly without first reviewing in part I of 
this chapter the literature dealing with the developmental theory of democracy regarding 
transition of democracy and secondly in part II reviewing the literature dealing with the role 
of the military in transitions. 
Part I Developmental theory of Democracy
Is Egypt undergoing a transition to democracy? The case study of the role of the Egyptian 
military in the transition uses the definition of transition which is developed by Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986a:6). This means that the transition starts by the 
termination of an authoritarian regime and comes to an end by the establishment of an 
alternative regime. Their alternative regime can be democratic or authoritarian. The transition 
is an interval between two regimes (1986b). Applying the definition given by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter Egypt finds itself in this interval and therefore in a transition. But is it a transition to 
8a “democratic rule”? This question will addressed in the empirical chapter and answered in 
the concluding chapter of this paper. 
Diamond has classified non-democratic regimes and addressed the types of agenda’s that 
must be accomplished to obtain a successful transition to democracy(1999:64-117). His 
concept regarding the developmental theory of democracy is used as a theoretical framework 
in the case study. 
Diamond views democracy as a developmental phenomenon (1999:17). Viewed from a 
developmental perspective democracy develops in parts or in stages (Sklar:1987). He 
perceives continued democratic development as a challenge for all countries and all new and 
established democracies. The fate of democracy is thus perceived as open-ended. Moreover, 
democratic development may move both ways. Just as electoral democracies can become 
more democratic. They also can become more illiberal and less democratic. Diamond 
suggests that all political systems including democracies –liberal or otherwise- tend to 
become rigid, corrupt, and unresponsive over time in the absence of periodic reform and 
renewal. Democracy may even effectively disappear. This may happen through the 
breakdown or overthrow of formal democratic institutions and other processes of decay. This 
is a phenomenon Diamond calls the progressive “hollowing out” of formal democracy
(1999:19).
Electoral democracies can become more democratic. However Diamond argues that many 
new democracies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America face serious challenges in reducing the
autonomous and democratically unaccountable power of the military (1999:113). In the case 
of Egypt the role of the military in a transition process can be a crucial one. Part II of this 
9chapter will based on the work of Felipe Agüero explore the role the military can play in a 
transition process.
Part II Role of the military in transitions
Agüero explores the role of the military in transition of democratization in depth in his study 
of Post-Franco Spain (1995). Agüero’s study developed a theoretical framework answering
the question how the Spanish pro-democratic movement was able to force the military to 
accept a democratic regime that results in dismissing Franco’s political legacy.
The analysis includes both the transition and the post-transition period. This is relevant 
because each of these phases results according to Agüero in opportunity structures by which 
political actors can be influenced (Agüero:1998). Which political actor will at the end conquer? 
The answer to this question is dependant on how successful civilian or military rulers are in 
mobilizing political resources within both phases. In order to subordinate the military to 
civilian control Diamond points out that civilian institutional capacities to manage and 
oversee the subordination must be strengthened in the executive and legislative branches
(1999:76).
The power of civilian leaders and the power of the military leaders is shaped by different 
factors. Agüero identifies the following four factors (1995:33). Whether the former regime 
was a civilianized one or a militarized one is one factor. Because General Franco’s regime 
was a civilianized regime Agüero argues that the military had a subordinated role during the 
transition period. The second factor is the transition path. Was the path marked by a gradual 
liberalization or was it an abrupt breakdown of authoritarianism? The Spanish transition path 
was a gradual path. This path was dominated by results of negotiations between civilian and 
military leaders. The third factor refers to support of public for democracy. Was the public 
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opinion in favour of democracy or was the support of public for democracy feeble? The 
Spanish civilians leaders were driven by strong public support for democracy. The military 
was aware of this support. The strong union of key political groups is the fourth factor Agüero 
mentions in his study of civil-military relations. The union was in the Spanish case strong 
enough to challenge the army. 
Did the role that the Spanish military played help make the transition to democracy successful? 
The success depends according to Agüero’s research to the ability of being successful as
civilian leaders in realizing democratic desires of the public and how the political elites 
interact during the transition and the post-transition period. Furthermore do the civilian 
leaders succeed in challenging the military and implementing civilian supremacy? Agüero 
defines civilian supremacy as the ability of a civilian, democratically elected government to 
conduct general policy without interference from the military, to formulate and conduct 
defence policy, and to monitor the implementation of military policy (1995: 19).
Agüero’s study states that Spain succeeded in her transition to democracy. He emphasizes on 
who exercises control over the transition. In the case studies of Agüero proved that the 
success depended on whether the transition was controlled by civilians aiming to establish a 
new government or by military aiming to prevent further occurrence of damage? The military 
should be strong enough to protect its own corporate interests, but should not be strong 
enough to effectively oppose changes to the political system. 
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Chapter III Research Design
Diamond (1999:113) argues that new democracies face a particularly difficult and dangerous 
challenge when they are established through a military coup. Establishing civilian supremacy 
is then a very complex and dangerous process. He argues that many of the factors that 
promote democratic consolidation skilled political leadership; unity among civilian political 
forces (across partisan and other divides); civilian expertise (both inside and outside 
government) on national security matters; and luck (in the form of divisions within the 
military, and the military rebellions), are required to establish civilian supremacy. The 
concept of civilian supremacy will be tested in the Egyptian case. 
The Egyptian case lacks the factors that help establish civilian supremacy and makes it very 
difficult to establish civilian supremacy. The hypothesis in this research paper is that without 
establishing civilian supremacy the Egyptian military will not play the role of promoting 
democratization. 
Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter argue for a crucial distinction amongst regime 
supporters in authoritarian states between “hard-liners” and “soft-liners.” The hard-liners 
“believe that the perpetuation of authoritarian rule is possible And desirable, if not by 
rejecting outright all democratic forms, then by erecting some façade behind which they can 
maintain inviolate the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of their power.” The soft-liners 
develop the “increasing awareness that the regime … in which they usually occupy important 
positions, will have to make use … of some degree or some form of electoral legitimation,” 
and that the longer such reforms are delayed the more dangerous the situation becomes for the 
regime (1986b:16). A key part of the transition approach is that during the transition, and 
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particularly during the sensitive early stages, the “hard-liners” have the ability to use coercive 
force to stop the transition. If the soft-liners are not strong enough, then the transition is much 
more difficult, if not impossible. Thus transition to democracy requires divisions among the 
regime in order to succeed (1986b:23ff).
There are several indices available to measure democracy. This case study will use the 
Freedom House Index. Egypt has according to the freedom house report on 2012 the status 
not free. Details on the status can be found in the following figure. Scores in each category are 
from 0-7. 0 is the weakest in performance, and 7 is the strongest in performance.
Source: freedom house report 2012
In this paper, my research question focuses the role of the military in the democratization of 
Arab authoritarian regimes. The examination will be conducted through a instrumental single 
case study of Egypt. There are different theories which explain democratization in general and 
democratization in the Arab world in particular. The theory of democratization developed by 
Larry Diamond (1999) will be used. Data retrieved from publications and reports of NGO’s, 
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freedom house, Amnesty International, United Nations, and Egyptian government documents 
and speeches as well as online and printed newspaper will help identify the actions the 
military has taken during the revolution and during the post-revolution period. These actions 
shape the role they have assumed in regard to the democratization.
In order to study the correlation between democratization and the military I first reviewed the 
literature regarding military civilian relations in the third waves democracies. The studies of 
Huntington, Plattner, Diamond and Agüero on militaries and democracy provided the basis 
for designing the research. The level of democratization is the dependant variable. The 
explanatory variables are the past military civilian relations since 1952, level of 
professionalism of the Armed forces and the economic power of the Armed Forces. The 
independent variable is the role of the military.
The object of research is very broad and worth extensive research. The decision-making
process in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces related to the actions the military took 
during the revolution and the post revolution period is out of scope, because of the lack 
research data regarding this aspect. Also out of scope is the cultural and behavioural aspect of 
the military officials. There is no research material available of their attitudes toward 
democratic values. This paper will not provide an ideal in depth analysis. The objective of this 
thesis is to gain through a single case study more insight into the relationship between the role 
of the military and democratization of authoritarian Arab countries that have militaries which 
are deep rooted in the society and plays an important economic role in society(as shown by 
data retrieved from the countries studies series on Egypt in the digital library of the US 
Congress). 
14
I selected the Egyptian case to study the role of the military in democratization because since 
the establishment the Republic of Egypt in 1952 the military always sided with the ruler in 
facing uprising or revolts or pursuits of opposition for democratic changes. In 2011 something 
in the relationship between the ruler and his military changed. The Egyptian Armed Forces is 
-based on the CIA factbook- the 10th largest in the world and the largest in the Africa and the 
Arab world. The following branches are part of the Armed Forces: Egyptian Navy, Egyptian 
Air Force, Egyptian Air Defense Command and the Egyptian Army. Egypt also maintains a 
large paramilitary forces. The Central Security Forces and the Border Guard Forces fall under 
the ministry of the interior and the National Guard under the control of the ministry of 
defence. Egyptian military being the oldest, most professional and largest Arab military is 
better as a research subject than other Arab militaries, because unlike other Arab militaries of
the Mena countries, which dealt with the Arab spring, one can find data and information that 
help examine the role Arab militaries play in democratization. It will be difficult to generalize 
the findings of this research paper because the time that had passed since the beginning of 
Arab Spring is too short.
Mena Freedom house comparison 2012 
Source: Freedomhouse 2012 
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The focus of the theoretical approach is democratization proces. One of the objectives is to 
examine how the Egyptian army case fits into the existing literature on democratization. The 
interactions, pacts and bargains struck by the Egyptian military and civilians are examined in 
chapter IV. The examination is divided in two stages: the revolution period, the post-
revolution period. Reviewing the result of the interactions taken by the military, as the current 
ruler, and the civilians gives insight in what Grugel en Riggirozzi call the institutional rules
that will define the practice of democracy in the transition (2012).
Re-examining assumptions academics made on a number of subjects, especially on the 
military’s role in Arab politics is one of the objectives of this paper. The army has to choose 
between either peaceful transition, a return to repression or fragmentation. Analysing the 
choice the army made in the selected cases by examining whether they have changed their 
professional and corporate identity will help predict their readiness to accept readjustment of 
their institutionalization into state systems and on the manner and pace in which this is 
pursued by other actors. 
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Chapter IV The case study of the Egyptian army
The research question regarding the role of the Egyptian Military in hindering or promoting 
democratization in Egypt will be answered in three parts. The first part deals with the role of 
the military in the revolutionary period. The second part focuses on the role of the military 
during the post-revolutionary period. The last part explores the role of the military and 
transition to “democracy”. The following four sub-questions that are related to the research 
question and will be addressed in the different parts of this chapter: First why did the 
Egyptian army not side with president Mubarak and defend him? And secondly how did the 
military after the collapse of Mubarak use the opportunity to meet the demands of the public 
for democratic changes? The third sub-question deals with the military actively intervening in 
the political process by creating conditions that help promote or sabotage peaceful transfer of 
her powers. The last question addresses the relationship between the actions and 
democratization: Will the actions of the Supreme Council of the Army lead to 
democratization?
Part IThe role of the military in the revolution-period
Barany has examined the role of the military (2011:26ff) in the period of the uprisings. He 
presents an analysis of the military's significance in political revolutions in six Arab countries.
His main finding is that while military support is not the only necessary factor in a successful 
revolution, it is the one essential force without which a coup will not be realized (2011:24).
The results of the comparative analysis Barany conducted on six Arab countries show that the 
role the Egyptian military played in the revolution was a decisive role in overthrowing 
president Mubarak. The Egyptian military sided with the protesters (Sanger:2011). The army 
did not open fire against the people and protesters gathering in Tahrir Square were not 
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stopped by the military. The military had chosen to be neutral (Emadi:2011). According to the 
reports of the US state department the turning point to give up on their neutral position was 
caused by the attacks of the supporters of Mubarak and the violence they unleashed on 2 
February 2011. Mubarak tried to meet the public’s demand by agreeing not to seek re-election 
and not put his son up for succession. His attempt to restore the peace in Egypt through these 
concessions and manage the riots by confronting the protesters with extreme violence was far 
from successful (Hauslohner:2011). The army supported the protesters, because they 
witnessed the lack of support among the people for Mubarak’s regime and that the people did 
not give in to repression. The military feared that the situation would hurt its interests and will 
result in the loss of influence and power (Steavenson 2011:43). On 10 February 2011 the 
Supreme Council took the power. The Supreme Council announced on 13 February 2011 that 
the constitution would be suspended, both houses of parliament would be dissolved, and that 
the military would rule for six months until elections could be held. The prior cabinet would 
continue to serve as a caretaker government until a new one is formed. The siding of the army 
with the protesters is remarkable because up to the uprisings the military played a major role 
in the stability of the authoritarian regime of Mubarak (Pripstein Posusney 2004). 
Before answering the first sub question related to the research question on the role of the 
Egyptian military in hindering or promoting democratization it is important to find out which 
place the military’s took in the former authoritarian regime. 
Because Mubarak’s regime en regimes before him lacked transparency and the structures of 
power were surrounded by secrecy it was difficult to obtain accurate information regarding 
the Egyptian military. To identify the place the military’s took in the former regime this 
research paper relies on the facts, figures and findings regarding the report on politics in 
Egypt that can be found in the digital countries studies of the library of the US Congress. The 
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report is produced by the Federal Research Division and provides customized research and 
analytical services on domestic and international subjects to agencies of the United States 
Government, the District of Colombia, and authorized Federal contractors on a cost-covery 
basis. The digital Countries Studies series on Egypt present a description and analysis of the 
historical setting and the social, economic, political, and national security systems and 
institutions of countries throughout the world. The following paragraph contains a brief 
summary of the relevant passages regarding military-civilian relations in Egypt since the 
revolution of 1952.
Military-civilian relations since the revolution of 1952
President Nasser's Free Officers founded republican government in 1952. This was the result 
of a revolution that was led by the free officers. Nasser, an ex-military became president and 
established presidential supremacy over the military. Kassem’s study shows that President 
Nasser disregarded political parties and democracy because of the post-imperial experience of 
Egypt. As a result, revolutionary leaders were afraid of continuing the pre-revolutionary 
political system. President Nasser in 1957 said publicly:
“Can I ask you a question: what is democracy? We were supposed to have a   
democratic system during the period 1923 to 1953. But what good was this 
democracy to our people? I will tell you. Landowners and Pasha... used this 
kind of democracy as an easy tool for the benefits of a feudal system... the 
peasants would cast their votes according to the instructions of their masters... I 
want to liberate the peasants and workers both socially and economically... I 
want the peasants and workers to say "yes" and "no" without any of this 
affecting their livelihood or their daily bread. This in my view is the basis of 
freedom and democracy.” (Kassem: 2004)
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After the death of Nasser another ex-military became president: Sadat. Demilitarization of the 
state and depoliticization of the officer corps were two major successes during his presidency. 
He was successful in changing the military from the dominant leadership group in the state 
into a professional force subordinate to legal authority. Deradicalization that ended the army’s 
role as ‘defender of the revolution’ and as defender of the Arab nation against imperialism 
accompanied the changes brought by Sadat. Although this were major changes that help 
prevent a military rule in Egypt Sadat did not accomplish the establishment of the concept of 
“civilian supremacy”. Larry Diamond -based on the study of Felipe Agüero regarding Civilian 
Supremacy in South America – points out that “civilian supremacy”
‘…gives democratically elected government unquestioned authority over all policy 
arenas, including defining the goals and overseeing the organization and 
implementation of national defense. In such a system, the military role is constrained 
to matters of national defense and international security, the military is removed from 
all responsibility for internal security, and governmental structures (such as civilian 
ministry of defense) exist to enable civilians to exercise effective oversight and control 
of the military (as well as the intelligence services)’ (1999: 113)
President Sadat did not have a democratically elected government and the military was not 
removed from all responsibility for internal security. The report on Egypt in the library of Us 
Congress shows that Sadat was able to continue the tradition of presidential authority that was 
established during the ruling of Nasser. Moreover Sadat reinforced the legal supremacy of 
presidential authority over all state institutions. 
The military remained a powerful corporate actor in the political system. This can be 
illustrated by the case of Abdul Halim Abu Ghazala who was Minister of Defence under 
Mubarak. The report on Egypt in the library of US Congress points out that his case 
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manifested both the power and limits of the military establishment. Because Mubarak was 
initially less careful than Sadat to rotate military chieftains and to balance them with rival 
officers or with strong civilian politicians. As a result, Abu Ghazala, who was profiled by the 
report of the countries studies of the US Congress as an ambitious politicized and 
conservative general, appeared according to the content of the report to establish 
unprecedented power and acknowledged status as the number-two man in the regime.
However Minister of Defence, Abu Ghazala, did not have the authority to appoint military.
Mubarak in an attempt to balance the power of Abu Ghazala positioned his own men as chief 
of staff and as minister of war production. Mubarak had no difficulty removing him from his 
post in 1989. The report states that Mubarak tried to curb military aggrandizement that 
diminished the civilian sector. As to why the Egyptian military did not challenge the power of 
Mubarak the report mentions the following reasons. 
“The professionalization of the officer corps, its tradition of respect for legal
legitimacy, and the reluctance of an army lacking in national vision or ambition 
to assume responsibility for Egypt's problems all made it unlikely that any top 
general could carry the officer corps in an overt challenge to Mubarak.” 
(The digital countries studies series Egypt)
The concept of Felipe Aguero’s ‘Civilian supremacy’ was under the ruling of Sadat, Nasser 
not established. The lack of this supremacy continued under the ruling of Mubarak. The 
electoral system in Egypt under which the National Democratic Party operated did not meet 
the standards of electoral democracies (Kassem: 1999). The political system was designed to 
ensure solid majorities for the ruling National Democratic Party at all levels of government
(Freedomhouse 2009). The People ‘s Assembly is constitutionally empowered to challenge 
and question presidential authority, but in reality it is confined by presidential powers beyond 
its control (Blaydes 2011). Article 152 of the constitution helps the president to bypass the 
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People’s Assembly and endorse his proposals through a referendum. Kassem argues that 
artikel 152 makes it impossible for the Assembly to consider or reject the policy of the 
president (1999: 37)
Mubarak had control over the military up to the revolution of 2011 (Kamrava 2000). The first 
sub question of the research question which will be answered in the next paragraph should 
give insight into why Mubarak lost his control over the military, because obviously they did 
not side with the former president.
No presidential control over the military
Why did the Egyptian army not side with president Mubarak and defend him?
The position the army takes in the Egyptian economics is important and has been explored in
the study of Barany (2011:26ff). The Generals were very involved in many economic 
domains such as agriculture, tourism and military-gear production. The National Integrity 
System Study on Egypt in 2009 shows the military has benefits from these revenues without 
state control. In the report of 2011 Egypt ranked 112 on the corruption Perceptions Index. 
Egypt’s indices was 2.9. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries or territories based 
on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates 
the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 10, where 0 means that a 
country is perceived as highly corrupt and 10 means that a country is perceived as very clean. 
A country's rank indicates its position relative to the other countries or territories included in 
the index.
The military directly profits from its economic involvement through high salaries plus 
preferential treatment in medical care, housing, and transport (Chatterjee:2011). Furthermore 
Reports from the US state department show that the army receives financial military aid from 
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the United States. To maintain the financial military aid from the United States Government 
the military will have to keep its role in politics limited to continue good relations with the 
west. When Mubarak prior to his resignation lost his support from the west the military stood 
to loose its financial aid and support from the United State government if it had sided with 
Mubarak. How important the aid is to the military is shows by the following ‘Wikileak cable’ 
of the US Ambassador to Egypt.
Source: the Guardian, 14 February 2011
There are other factors that may have played a role in the decision making of the military and 
are worth researching but are out of scope of this research paper. The factors have been 
indicated by diplomats and experts on Egypt on the matter of why Mubarak lost his power 
over his military. The media has speculated about the militaries discontent about Mubarak 
putting his son, Gamal Mubarak, up for elections and the bad relationship Gamal Mubarak 
had with the military elites (Thanassis 2010). .The first deals with the fact that military elites 
despised Gamal Mubarak. The former US Ambassador speculated about the military being
dissatisfied with the dependency of the authoritarian regime on a large police and security 
apparatus employing 1.4 million people. The other unverified factor touches upon the 
structure and the population of Egyptian military. The military officers are deeply rooted into 
Cable dated:2008-03-16T16:43:00
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000524
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S AND NEA/FO WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP DOD FOR OSD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/28
TAGS: PARM, PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PTER, IS, EG, XF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MINDEF TANTAWI'S VISIT TO THE U.S. MARCH 24-28
REF: A. CAIRO 452 B. CAIRO 488 C. CAIRO 507
CAIRO 00000524 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (a)(b)&(d).
1. (S) Summary: Defense Minister Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi will travel to Washington, Tampa, and Chicago March 24-28. He will 
meet senior officials in Washington and at USCENTCOM HQ in Tampa, and view U.S. civil defense arrangements in Chicago. Mrs. Tantawi 
and as many as five senior generals will accompany him. Tantawi will seek assurances that the USG will not condition or reduce military 
assistance to Egypt in the future. He will emphasize Egypt's continuing value to the United States as an indispensable ally in the region, and 
he will press to return BRIGHT STAR to a full field training exercise. The eighty-year-old veteran of five wars with Israel is committed to 
preventing another one ever. But he is also frozen in the Camp David paradigm and uncomfortable with our shift to the post-9/11 GWOT. 
Recognizing that he is reluctant to change, we nonetheless should urge Minister Tantawi towards a broader and more flexible partnership 
based on shared strategic objectives, including border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and civil defense. End Summary.
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society at large that even if the generals had been willing to open fire on the protesters, many 
soldiers would have refused to obey their orders. 
Part II The role of the military in the post-revolutionary period
How did the military after the collapse of Mubarak use the opportunity to help build a 
democracy by meeting the demands of the public? 
The demands of the protesters prior to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak are summarized in 
the pamphlet that circulated the internet (find below).
Source: http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/mt/assets/science/Page%202_rev2.jpg
In this paragraph each demand will be examined with the help of sources from printed, visual 
and internet media coverage of the revolution and post revolution in order to establish how far 
the Supreme Council has succeeded in meeting the demand of the protesters. The examination 
of the ability of the military to meet these demands can help in identifying the role the 
military has played in the post-revolutionary period. The following five factors will be treated 
in chronological order: downfall of the regime, suspension of the emergency Law, freedom, 
justice, transfer of power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to a democratic 
civilian-government and the constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources.
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Downfall of the regime
The demand regarding the downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak is met partially on 11 
February 2011 by the resignation of Mubarak. The president, his sons and other government 
officials have been put on trial. The former National Democratic Party has been dissolved.
However Mubarak’s regime was in place with the help of other key players within the 
military. Those players have not stepped down. The following ‘Wikileak cable’ shows that the 
current chairman of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has strong ties to the old 
regime and has been profiled by US diplomats as being change resistant. 
Source: Guardian 14 february 2011
Based on the fact that former players in the military elite are still in office it is fair to conclude 
that the first demand of the people has only been met partially. The pre-revolutionary 
structure and mission of the military who was part of the former regime (see table 1) has not 
been changed. Diamond has argued that time is needed for civilian and military elites to adapt 
to new structures and authority and to develop confidence and trust in one another. 
The emergency law has given the military and the president a very powerful base to operate 
and disregard human rights. Especially for military officers Diamond makes an argument that 
they need to be convinced that expanding civilian control will not compromise the nation’s 
7. (S) Reform: In the cabinet, where he still wields significant influence, Tantawi has opposed both economic and political reforms that he perceives 
as eroding central government power. He is supremely concerned with national unity, and has opposed policy initiatives he views as encouraging 
political or religious cleavages within Egyptian society. In a speech on March 9, Tantawi said one of the military's roles is to protect constitutional 
legitimacy and internal stability, signaling his willingness to use the military to control the Muslim Brotherhood in the run-up to the April 9 
municipal council elections. On economic reform, Tantawi believes that Egypt's economic reform plan fosters social instability by lessening GOE 
controls over prices and production. Tantawi rejects any conditioning on Egyptian FMF on human rights or any other grounds. Before this year he 
thought that FMF was inviolable and regarded ESF as a layer of protection against possible cuts to FMF. He will argue that any conditions on 
military assistance are counter-productive. He will also state that the military is not behind human rights problems in Egypt and that U.S. 
Congressional human rights conditionally is mis-targeted.
8. (S) Washington interlocutors should be prepared to meet an aged and
change-resistant Tantawi. Charming and courtly, he is, nonetheless mired in a post-Camp David military paradigm that has served his cohort's 
narrow interests for the last three decades. He and Mubarak are focused on regime stability and maintaining the status quo through the end of their 
time. They simply do not have the energy, inclination or world view to do anything differently. Nonetheless, for the benefit of Tantawi's 
omnipresent aides, we should focus discussions on the future and how to operate as strategic partners as we face the challenges of that future 
together. RICCIARDONE
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security or the institutional prestige and integrity of the military (1999: 115). The generational 
change that can make old-line commanding officers, who may have been responsible for 
human right violations under authoritarian rule be succeeded by younger officers who are 
better able to adapt to a more constrained military role is according to Diamond a long-term 
process (1999:115). 
Suspending Emergency Law 
The emergency law has been forced since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, except for an 18-month 
break in 1980. This law entails far reaching police powers and legalizes censorship and results 
in suspension of constitutional rights (Samer 2004). Regarding the second demand it is fair to 
conclude that the demand for ending the Emergency Law is not entirely met. The Emergency 
Law attacks human rights (Samer 2004). 
Freedom house and Amnesty International reported in 2011 that the government has the right 
to tap telephones, intercept mail, conduct warrantless searches, and indefinitely detain 
suspects without charge if they are deemed a threat to national security. The 2011 Amnesty 
report on Human Rights shows that the authorities continued to use state of emergency 
powers to attack government critics, opposition political activists and people suspected of 
security-related offences.
Freedom
The demand for freedom has not been met. Amnesty’s report 2012 on violating of human 
rights and liberties leaves no doubt about the fact that this demand has not been met. Freedom 
of the press has according to the freedom house report on 2012 improved slightly after 
Mubarak’s departure in early 2011, particularly through an increase in independent television 
stations and other media, but it continues to be restricted in law and practice (Martini & 
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Taylor 2011). Although the bbc media coverage and other visual media reported that the 
internal security agency has been dissolved and the State Security Investigation Service will 
be replaced with a new "National Security Force" which will be responsible for protecting the 
domestic front and combating terrorism, there is no evidence the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces has engaged in an in-depth reform of the justice department and the ministry of 
internal affairs and there is no guarantee that the new “National Security Force” will not 
engage in the same human right violations that were conducted by the dissolved State 
Security Investigation Service. The Supreme Council for Armed Forces granted freedom to 
establish political parties. The legislation made a lot of restrictions.  New parties have to have 
at least 5000 members from at least ten of Egypt’s provinces. Parties based on religion or 
class can not be established. 
Freedom house report on 2012 concludes that Egypt is not free. Egypt is not an electoral 
democracy. For most of 2011, the Supreme Council exercised executive powers, appointing a 
series of short-lived, interim civilian cabinets. The existing parliament was dissolved in 
February, and a new legislature was not scheduled to be seated until the completion of 
parliamentary elections in early 2012. Egypt’s freedom rating is 5.5. On civil liberties Egypt 
scores 5. On political rights Egypt scores 6.
Diamond argues that people expect from any political system more than economic growth and 
security (1999: 47). People also value liberty and security. He defines liberty and security as 
freedom from terror and violence by both state and non-state actors (1999:47). When the 
military is not accountable to civilian oversight and justice a critical amount of power, 
according to Diamond, is out of reach of effective control of citizens and their representatives 
and can be turned against them at any time (1999:48). 
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The Egyptian case shows after testing whether the three previous demands has been met in the 
post-revolutionary period that the military-civilian relations can be characterized as seriously
lacking civilian supremacy. By not meeting the demand of the “downfall of the regime”, 
“suspension of emergency law”, and “freedom” the civilian supremacy has not been 
established in the post-revolutionary period in Egypt. The findings regarding the next demand 
in this paragraph, “justice’, is connected with the lack of freedom in Egypt.
Justice
Diamond insists that for a rule of law to be ensured elected executives, state bureaucrats, 
soldiers, and police cannot be held accountable without a judicial system that has the 
constitutional and political autonomy (1999:111). No evidence in the reports of Human rights 
watch or Freedomhouse or mediacoverage could be found that indicate that the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces has started to reform the pre-revolutionary justice system. The 
pre-revolutionary system is features by inequality and lack of transparency (Brown 1997)
Diamond’s concept of the judicial system not only constitutional and political autonomy. It 
also requires independent and professional judges who in turn require good pay, a secure and 
substantial term in office, and depolitized procedures for selection (1999:112). Egypt lacks a 
judicial system that meats the requirements of Diamond. He demands that judges have 
staffing and financial and technical resources to be effective and that they be served and 
petitioned by an infrastructure of institutions that compose an effective legal system:
prosecutors, public defenders, police, investigators, legal aid programs, bar associations and 
law schools. A body of law that is clearly codified and widely accessible and democratic in 
spirit and citizens committed to the rule of law are necessary (1999:112).
The demand of the protestors for justice has not been met by the Supreme Council of Armed 
Forces. The Freedom house report on 2012 is clear about the lack of justice. The report notes 
that under the Emergency Law “Security” cases are usually referred to executive-controlled 
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exceptional courts that deny defendants many constitutional protections and that the verdicts 
of this exceptional courts can not be appealed. Political activist are acoording to the freedom
house report often tried under the Emergency Law. The judges in these courts lack according 
to the report of the UNHCR organization on Egypt independency. They are appointed directly 
by the president. Bergling, Wennerström, and Sannerholm confirm this in their study on 
Egyptian courts that was published in 2012. 
Transfer of power from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to a civilian-
government
This demand has not been met yet. However on 23 January 2012 the democratically elected 
representatives of the Parliament got the transfer of legislative authority from the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces.
Constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources
This demand has not been met yet. However on 23 January 2012 the democratically elected 
representatives of the Parliament got the transfer of legislative authority from the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces.
Part III The role of the military and democratization
Did the military actively intervene in the political process by creating conditions that help 
promote or sabotage a peaceful transition of her powers?
The military has actively sabotaged a peaceful transition of her powers. The army intervened 
in setting the rules for the elections of both the parliament and the next president and the draft 
of the new constitution (Youssef 2011). An administrative court suspended the 100-member 
constitutional assembly tasked with drafting a new constitution for Egypt (Kirkpatrick 2012).
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Activists who seek democratic change are tried under the emergency law. The army has used 
violence and abused the emergency law to sabotage the revolution after the fall of Mubarak. 
In battle with protesters on several occasions the Army opened fire and abused human rights
according to the Amnesty human right report on 2012. The Army also had effectively the 
final decision on who could be candidate for the presidency (Youssef 2011). The Supreme 
Presidential Electoral Commission disqualified ten candidates without stating the reason for 
rejection and the appeals of the rejected candidates were overthrown (Youssef 2011).
Do the actions of the Supreme Council of the Army lead to democratization?
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has pledged to transfer power. By looking at the 
scorecard –as outlined in figure 1- the military took since the downfall of Mubarak it is fair to 
draw the conclusion that those actions do not fit a peaceful transition to a democratic rule.
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Political
Dissolve parliament and outlaw the National Democratic Party
Suspend the constitution and prepare a new one
Reform the electoral system
Hold free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections
Security/Human Rights
Arrest and try former regime officials
Lift the state of emergency
Accountability for violence during/since revolution
Reform the security forces and the military
Release political prisoners and abolish military trials
Other
Reform state media
Improve the country's economic position
Source: aljazeera
Key officials within the military who supported the former president have not been changed.
The chairman of the Supreme Council has served in the government as Minister of Defence
and Military Production since 1991 and was also Deputy Prime Minister in January–February 
2011. He is profiled as being not willing to implement changes. Kamrava has argued that high 
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ranking military officials who are change resistant are not willing to accept civilian 
supremacy after regime changes (2000:76).
Although the military is change resistant it has to facilitate the democratization process. The 
Egyptian military depends on the US aid. It receives according to the New York Times 1.3 
billion dollars on an annually basis. Otherwise it could loose its credits with the US 
government an its financial aid (Kamrava:2000). 
Without revision of the constitution prior to the presidential and parliamentary elections the 
soon to be elected president will find himself in the same position and have the same powers 
as the former president Mubarak. Study on constitutions show that it is highly risky to hold 
elections under the current unrevised conditions (Lomasky 2011). Free and fair elections do 
not coincide with dictatorship. The military itself should undergo major change. The
involvement of the military in the social economic domain is huge. Enterprises and important 
cultural and educational institutions have in their management ex-military officials. The 
governors who were appointed last year are ex-generals. The military is believed to control 
20%-40% of the economy ranging from pasta factories to manufacturers of weapons
(Chatterjee 2011).
Huntington has argued that the maintenance of non-democratic rule depends on the coercive 
apparatus of the state (1991:13). Any transition to democratic rule relies on whether the 
military can unloose itself from politics (Huntington 2004). Reasons to do so may be that the 
military believe it cannot maintain non-democratic rule, the military may believe that the 
continuation of non democratic rule is contrary to its interests, or the military elite can come 
to actively favour democratization (Fukuyama 2011). 
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After exploring the political choices and actions the Supreme Council took during the post-
revolutionary period and answering the sub questions posed in this chapter, the thesis’s 
research question: “which role did the Egyptian military play in promoting or hindering the 
democratization process?” can be answered as follows. The Egyptian played a hindering role 
to the democratization process. The Egyptian army has based on the answers to the sub 
questions not yet unloosed itself from politics and by doing so helps maintaining a non-
democratic rule. 
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Chapter V Conclusion
Based on the findings in chapter IV the role that the military has played in democratization 
process after the uprising is a role that can be characterized in a general as a hindering role. 
The only promoting role the military assumed was at the beginning of the revolution. The 
military promoted the fall of Mubarak and after transfer of power there was no evidence 
found that the military took action to revise the pre-revolutionary developed civilian-military 
relations. The civilian-military relations were developed over a period of 40 years beginning 
with the establishment of the republic of Egypt in 1952.
The hypothesis made in this research paper is that the Egyptian Military can assume a 
promoting role in the democratization process if the military subjects itself to the civilian 
supremacy. Up until now there are no indicators that the military will establish voluntarily the 
civilian supremacy. The Egyptian civilians should in my opinion follow a strategy that 
civilians in the Spanish revolution followed. Felipe Agüero who studied the Spanish case 
found that the civilians were successful in establishing civilian supremacy by pursuing  
reforms incrementally, through bargaining, dialogue, and consensus building rather than blunt 
confrontation (1995).
Diamond provided a recipe for reducing the resistant of the military for changes. This recipe 
may be applicable in the Egyptian case. The civilians should consider awarding the military 
with a position of status, honour, income under the condition that the military never use the 
military as a power resource in political competition; and the military avoid political 
interference in routine promotions; and The military avoid highly conflictual trials for crimes 
committed under the former regime (1999:114). Diamond’s solution for managing the change 
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resistance may be helpful in Egypt, but it has to be accompanied by what Alfred Stepan calls 
“democratic empowerment” (Stepan & Robertson 2004). Democratic empowerment requires 
civilians to develop the competence to manage and monitor military budgets, acquisitions, 
training, promotions and operations intelligently and responsibly. He argues that building up 
civilian expertise to staff the defence ministry; the foreign intelligence bureau; legislative 
oversight committees; the more informal inputs and scrutiny that must come from the 
academy; policy community; and mass media is necessary and is a long-term process. In case 
of “democratic empowerment” Diamond refers to Agüero stating that 
“Untimely civilian effort to initiate military reform may prove counterproductive. The 
need to reassure the military during the first years [following a democratic transition] 
  may ….. demand postponement of reform measures, particularly in those areas
deemed most sensitive. Civilian expertise is most effective if put into practice when at 
least some degree of confidence between the new authorities and the military
developed.”(1999:15)
In his study on democratization Diamond made a plea in transitions from authoritarian rule 
for slowly removing the military from the political arena, including from such non-military 
responsibilities as rural development, civic action, domestic intelligence, policing and 
participation in the cabinet(1999:114). The Egyptian Military reorientation to a more 
narrowly defined mission is thus necessary. However, reducing the size of the military and by 
doing so its capacity to seize and exercise political power -as required within the theoretical 
framework of Diamond (1999:114)- needs time and cooperation from the US administration. 
The Egyptian Army receives 1.3 billion dollars annually. Developing new missions and 
doctrines and changing military officer training and education will prove to be difficult, 
because it requires changes regarding believes and attitudes and military culture (Huntington 
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2006). Reorganizing force structures around weaponry better suited to performing the 
military’s mission of defending the country’s borders, such as assisting in times of national 
emergency or natural catastrophe, requires foreign aid and support.
The Egyptians should set out a strategy in order to reach democratization. A strategy by 
which military influence over non-military issues and functions is gradually reduced and 
civilian control is gradually established over matters of broad military and national security 
policy. These matters include according to Diamond strategy, force structure, deployment, 
expenditures, and –if armed conflict should come to pass- rule of engagement (1999:114).
Is democratization possible in Egypt? It is hard to make a prediction given the role the 
military has played until now. The departure of the military from politics and the economic 
domain is almost impossible. The army has too much at stake and has assumed the role of the 
preventer of disorder (Plattner 2011). The role of promoting democracy has as this research 
paper shows not been fulfilled by the Egyptian Military. It is also hard to predict who will 
assume the role of promoting democratization. Who ever takes up that role it wise to bare in 
mind the argument Diamond has made with regard to democracy promotion efforts. Diamond 
argues that democracy promotion efforts should target long-term political change and have 
the strategic aim to help gradually lay the foundations for market economies, constrained 
centres of power, rules of law, more resourceful civil societies, and the incremental 
development of competitive electoral processes (1999: 263).
The Indonesian may serve as a exemplary model for Egypt. Indonesia’s powerful military has 
gradually withdrawn from politics and accepted the civilian supremacy by skilful political 
elites (Crouch 2010). However the Indonesian civil-military relations have not yet succeeded 
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in making the military withdraw from economic participation (Chandra & Kammen 2012). 
Whether Indonesia’s model can be useful or applicable in Egypt is worth researching in a next 
paper.
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